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1. the european Governance Perspective in the transition context
It is generally agreed that social scientists and students of transition want the 
good society [1]. Frequently, in the context of East and Central Europe this political 
goal is connected with membership and active participation in the European 
Union (EU). As a consequence, the European Commission’s vice president Günter 
Verheugen expects that in 20 years from now all ‘European countries’ will have 
joined this organization [2]. His optimistic expectations about the future prospects 
of the integration process, however, are qualified by an important exception: 
countries of the post soviet space such as Russia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine 
are unlikely to become part of the club [3]. While not all parts of the political elite 
or the general public in these countries have been disappointed by this statement, 
it received considerable attention by the political community of Ukraine with its 
‘post Orange Revolution’ confirmation of a ‘European choice’ and the resulting 
expectation of having or being able to gain a clear membership perspective [4]. 
For the time being, the enlarged Union prefers to limit its activities to the 
export of its own governance model to this and other parts of the world in a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach that embraces democratic structures as the key ingredient 
to solve socio economic problems with the help of newly emerging, open civil 
societies [5]. Accordingly, the official take on ‘good governance’ demands ‘the 
transparent and accountable management’ of a country’s resources to achieve its 
equitable as well as sustainable economic and social development. Typically, this 
comes with strong normative claims as to the linkage with specific institutional 
arrangements and the demand for an unbiased participation of individuals in 
the legislative process that acknowledges criteria such as expertise, efficiency, 
accountability and transparency [6]. Hence ‘good governance’ relies on the 
formation of political, economic, social and cultural associations themselves 
subject to mutual controls and public oversight. It requires, moreover, a set of 
standard mechanisms in public administration that will implement policies by 
determining the distribution of bureaucratic and financial powers across different 
levels of government. Finally, it asks for an independent judicial system equipped 
with the ability to enforce sanctions and to ensure compliance with political 
decision making [7]. 
While there is no shortage of domestic obstacles to the initiation of respective 
democratisation processes in the EU’s neighbourhood, they have not prevented 
several observers from identifying a number of caveats to these strategic goals 
deriving from the supranational organization’s own internal practices. Among 
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those familiar with academic writings on the subject matter complaints about a 
‘democratic deficit’ and the inconsistent pursuit of policy objectives would hardly 
come as a surprise. Indeed, the mismatch between resources directed towards 
third countries for the actual improvement of governance arrangements and 
the rising pressures towards their speedy economic liberalisation places some 
question marks behind a genuine European style of democracy promotion [8]. If 
the Union in its external relations exclusively promotes governance arrangements 
in close congruence with internal mechanisms rather than in relation to the 
specific political, economic and social constraints of a neighbouring country, it 
might sooner or later have to deal with a number of unintended consequences 
given the low institutional capacities and the poor implementation record found in 
most transition contexts [9]. 
Alternatively, in a less benevolent interpretation, the motives of the Union 
to develop a foreign policy towards post soviet transition countries might be more 
firmly rooted in economic interests [10]. Gaining and granting market access 
through the gradual extension of co operation agreements offers a potentially more 
rewarding activity for both sides not the least because it could combine notions of 
conditionality with an assessment of progress made in terms of political reform. 
In fact, EU relations with Ukraine can serve as a crucial test to this proposition as 
the by and large delayed transformation process after independence was revived 
in the aftermath of a highly politicized presidential election in 2004. Since then 
Ukraine has gained the status of a free market economy from both the EU and the 
United States, opening the way towards a replacement of a dated EU Ukrainian 
Partnership and Co operation Agreement and a more recent Action Plan through a 
new, more forward looking document. In addition, the immediate prospect of the 
country joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is seen as a key step to tie 
even closer economic links with Europe [11].
At the same time, and in line with the EU’s perception as a ‘soft power’, such 
agreements come at the price of the acceptance of an underlying set of ideas, norms 
and values which might not easily travel into another territory. This is particularly 
problematic since the New Neighbourhood Policy (NNP) fundamentally rests 
on the assumption that the ‘European model’ has gained so much attraction 
that it could convince a ‘ring of friends’ to adopt major elements of the acquis 
communautaire without having the prospect of full membership. This obvious 
contradiction, while perfectly understandable from the EU’s own ‘inside out’ 
perspective with the functional imperative to combine internal and foreign policy 
goals, appears far more pronounced from the ‘outside in’. In other words, buying 
the European model abroad will be far more difficult than selling it at home 
(while, for some at least, the latter is already difficult enough). The commitment 
of post soviet states such as Ukraine to reform their political system along the 
blueprint of the EU’s new member states, and Poland in particular, may become 
a constant source of disappointment and disillusionment, if for opportunistic 
reasons specific institutional designs, operating principles and procedural rules 
are artificially separated from the major components of a common market in terms 
of policy output and welfare gain. 
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Therefore the question suggests itself to what extent Ukraine, given its unique 
domestic constellation of political forces, will be able to move closer to a particular 
system of governance championed by the EU. Without reviving the long standing 
debates about the country’s belonging to a Western or Eastern cultural tradition, it 
can be argued that the recent enlargement round has, if anything, erected significant 
barriers to catching up with other member states from East and Central Europe. 
This follows, first of all, from the absence of a viable EU accession strategy and 
hence a lack of constant social pressure to follow a road map and intermediate 
milestones leading to full membership. In this respect, the NNP constituted a 
fundamental break with the earlier ‘wider Europe’ strategy of the Commission, 
where still an attempt was made ‘to manage its new vulnerability towards its 
neighbours through a strategy similar to that applied during enlargement’ [12]. 
Secondly, taking institutional capacity building seriously and understanding 
European ‘external governance’ arrangements as inspired by notions of multi-
level governance (MLG), the chances for successful implementation in the 
post-communist states are frequently considered as low given ‘the importance 
of the pre-existing territorial distribution of power within states’ [13]. Thirdly, 
seen from Brussels the need to respond to the ‘economization of international 
politics’ and to construct a larger system of governance that regulates financial 
and monetary globalization could reduce a general ‘East European problem’ – let 
alone ‘regiolateral’ and single country issues – to a fairly minor point of concern 
[14].
This chapter, therefore, examines the theoretical status of MLG beyond 
the immediate reach of integration studies. It proposes to adjust the multi level 
perspective to the transition context for two reasons: On the one hand, to be able 
to employ a framework of analysis that does recognise the complex nature of 
Ukrainian efforts to integrate with European structures. On the other hand, to 
provide a realistic yardstick along which potential progress in the long term goal of 
Ukrainian EU membership could be evaluated. Not surprisingly, as a fairly recent 
conceptual innovation, MLG is still undergoing significant modifications and 
reformulations. As a consequence, each of the following sections will highlight 
differences between a standard set of MLG assumptions as present in the work 
of Hooghe and Marks and an ‘extended version’ (MLG x) built around a broader 
range of European contributions [15].
The latter tries to overcome some of the weaknesses of ‘governance thinking’ 
once applied to a particular transition country and, thus, attempts to capture better 
major developments in Ukrainian politics before and after the ‘Orange Revolution’ 
of November 2004. Whether Ukraine can be considered to be ‘safely’ on the 
path towards an EU style system of governance will be assessed with regard to 
the democratic features of its emerging political system, the competing role of 
alternative integration schemes and, finally, the influence of non state actors in the 
form of business interests. 
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2. multi-level governance and democratisation
Within Ukrainian political elites European integration is a constant option 
debated for the country’s future. However, for many observers it remains doubtful 
whether behind the implicit rejection of closer ties with Russia there stands an 
actual desire to transfer and share sovereignty with supranational institutions 
[16]. The fundamental problem how to bring system transformation into harmony 
with system integration into supranational structures remains largely unresolved. 
Arguably, integration with the East has lost many of its preconditions, but a truly 
proactive and creative policy for the rapprochement with Western institutions is 
likewise not in sight [17]. Therefore, Ukrainian efforts to become a member of 
the EU run the risk to become foremost a declaration of political intent without 
a corresponding intention to make progress in the implementation of policies 
facilitating system transformation. In other words, foreign policy intentions 
of full EU membership are not connected to internal reforms, even though the 
‘framework for Ukraine’s integration into European structures’ is set by its own 
domestic development, or more precisely, the way and speed with which Ukraine 
develops its political, economic and societal systems in line with the Copenhagen 
criteria [18].
Of course, asking for stable public institutions, a market economy and a 
strong civil society is inherently difficult in a country where state-building was a 
delayed process. Since Ukraine still is a ‘defective democracy’ and its relatively 
new constitution has only limited reach there are two different types of democratic 
deficits. At the same time, a weakness of EU-style representative democracy 
follows from its institutional development ‘as an offspring of national institutions 
that claim sovereignty in their respective territories’ [19]. Although the formal 
powers of both the European Parliament (EP) and the Ukrainian Parliament have 
been extended to address their perceived ‘democratic deficits’, this cannot hide 
a fundamental difference between the two institutions: in the EU-15 the liberal 
democratic state was ‘an outcome of state building’ before it became ‘the point of 
departure for European integration’ [20]. In the case of Ukraine, by contrast, there 
appears to be the need to achieve both simultaneously. 
How, if at all, is it possible to compare the problem of democratizing Ukraine 
with the problem of democratizing the EU? In the case of the latter Arthur Benz 
identified a ‘trilemma’ of the existing MLG arrangements: In the highly complex 
institutional structures of an enlarged Union the three promises of democracy 
as efficient decision-making, effective interest intermediation and public 
accountability are not easily fulfilled. In normative terms, he argues, the linkage 
of any particular national system of governance with the EU would have to rely on 
a ‘balanced system of division of competencies between existing institutions that 
impedes the fusion of powers as well as the uncoupling of processes in various 
arenas’ [21].
While such a balancing requirement appears particularly remote for current 
or aspiring accession countries, it is also worth noting that the existing record of 
MLG has not turned the EU into a benevolent organization. As Guy Peters and 
Jon Pierre have pointed out, European bargaining and negotiation processes are 
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hardly free of traditional power politics, the steering capacity of EU institutions 
towards common goals might be sometimes low, some of their key policy 
problems can remain without solutions and the regular resort to informal decision-
making processes might exacerbate inequalities among the participating political 
actors [22]. How, then, can EU external policies upgrade respect for constitutional 
rules and democratic control processes in aspiring member states in its immediate 
neighbourhood? 
In theory, at least, the language of MLG does also apply to the transition 
context of Ukraine. According to Hans van Zon, a ‘diffusion of authority’ has 
also taken place resulting in a ‘multi-layered policy-making body’ with various 
branches of government and bureaucracy producing considerable legislative 
output, albeit with only limited real consequences due to poor interdepartmental 
and cross-sectoral co-ordination [23]. In addition, it seems that the carriers of this 
co-ordination burden are frequently appointed on the basis of political loyalty 
rather than technical expertise. The Ukrainian state appears as having little control 
over the implementation of decisions despite the existence of an oversized inherited 
administrative apparatus. This ‘loss of control’, however, is not (as in traditional 
MLG accounts) due to participation in integration schemes, but a consequence 
of the break with an old, soviet style, control mania and the simultaneous lack of 
enforcement mechanisms for ‘new rules of the game’. 
In fact, Taras Wosnjak sees here the cause for the long-term maintenance of 
the status quo in Ukrainian politics despite an existing transformation in its actual 
form of government [24]. He claims that after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
the traditional party-political nomenclatura was able to use its receding power 
more effectively than other groupings from within society sincerely interested in 
a democratic transition. Consequently, for the old elite a ‘new project’ became 
possible by deliberately refocusing on administrative techniques and internal 
governance arrangements rather than by proposing and concentrating on a set of 
economic reforms per se. 
Thus, even from a ‘governance’ angle the mixed record of the Ukrainian 
political system does not necessarily come as a surprise. On the negative side, 
for example, a respective list could include an unaccountable presidential 
administration, slow progress in general administrative reforms and widespread 
corruption in addition to the unsolved issue of intergovernmental relations [25]. 
The highly praised, new Ukrainian constitution has not led to a clear delineation 
of competencies between President and Parliament, the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet. Moreover, the aftermath of the 2006 parliamentary elections highlighted 
once more the serious difficulties of political elites to comply with institutional 
prerogatives and to place executive power in a coalition government despite 
contending social forces. Therefore, Eberhard Schneider’s earlier description of 
Ukraine as a ‘defective democracy’ with non-liberal tendencies has continued to 
gain ground. As expected, certain policy areas are excluded from the political 
process and political actors find it hard to stick to the doctrine of a separation of 
powers under all circumstances [26]. 
Ultimately, only punctual equilibria have (re-) emerged combining formal 
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democratic institutions and informal practices in network-type arrangements. 
While it is true that after the introduction of a new constitution in 1996 the formal 
transformation of Ukraine progressed rather quickly, this creation of classic state 
institutions marked the move towards a presidential system where a single figure 
at the top could make authoritative decisions and exercise control over the state 
apparatus with the help of decree powers. In this context Keith Darden observed 
already during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma the vital role played by informal 
mechanisms [27]. In his account these ‘serve to expand the scope and resources 
of presidential authority’ whenever there are problems of implementation and 
compliance [28]. By granting approval to the selective violation of laws through 
state officials, for example, the political leadership ensured the implementation 
and compliance with key projects and regularly enhanced its capacity to govern. 
In breaking with this past, President Victor Yushchenko, explained the 
resignation of his first post-revolutionary cabinet as mainly driven by the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections rather than by any deterioration of personal 
relationships [29]. Thus he did perceive these events in much more pragmatic 
terms than the general public: Not a drama or tragedy, but merely a testing ground 
for the interplay of democratic political forces. By stressing his integrity, the major 
blame was put on a badly organised presidential staff and ministerial support 
structure still tight to inherited structures and operating under the assumption that 
administrative reform could only succeed through political repression or the use 
of bribery. 
Indeed, MLG-x has also pointed to co-ordination processes occurring 
outside formal procedures and institutions. Its conceptual affinity with network 
approaches, though, does lean to a more benevolent interpretation in reference to 
EU practices. Here they provide welcomed mechanisms to escape deadlocks and 
the risks of actual ‘ungovernmentability’ [30]. Less attention is paid to the fact 
that such informality sometimes comes at the price of less accountability not only 
along the horizontal axis between the EU Council, the European Parliament and 
the Commission, but more importantly, in the vertical interaction with national 
governments and their parliaments.
Nevertheless, in its external presentation and perception, the credibility of 
the government’s new pro-EU orientation could not be doubted and has been 
associated with clear progress in terms of institutionally guaranteed democratic 
rights and freedoms. The package deal between contending forces, for example, 
which opened the way for a re-run of the presidential elections at the end of 2004 
reduced presidential powers and passed on the right to appoint a prime minister 
to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament [31]. Therefore, the latter upgraded 
its credentials as a regular ‘focal point’ for the settlement of political conflicts 
and paved the way for the first free parliamentary elections since 1994 [32]. 
Equally important in maintaining the credibility of the system’s transformative 
capacity during a serious political crisis has been the country’s Supreme Court. 
In institutional terms it managed to perform the function of an independent and 
neutral arbiter ensuring the rule of constitutional law and shying away from 
informal mechanisms of problem-solving [33].
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Overall there are more encouraging signs that such macro-changes may slowly 
filter through to improve the credibility of internal governance arrangements. 
Some of the higher ranks of the civil service at least have shown their willingness 
to co-operate with the ministerial bureaucracy in EU member states to modernize 
their internal operation via twinning arrangements as part of the NNP [34]. At 
this stage, limits as to department choice and project selection are obvious, 
though there is an attempt to link this with complementary institutional changes 
manifest in the reconfiguration of European affairs throughout the organisation 
of government [35]. Along the blueprint of multi-level arrangements in the ‘old 
member states’ all ministries have created the post of junior minister for European 
affairs and announced the creation of sectorally-defined divisions responsible for 
the implementation of a combined EU-Ukrainian action plan [36].
3. alternative regulatory frameworks? 
The post-soviet space offers rich opportunities to distribute authority through 
a variety of international, intergovernmental and supranational organisations. 
Accordingly there is a complex set of constraints on current or prospective 
memberships and a potential relocation as well as dispersion of political control 
functions along the governance approach in international relations. At the same 
time, prospective multi–level arrangements do not sideline questions of hierarchy 
in terms of specific institutional powers vis-à-vis individual countries and with 
regard to the delineation of competencies in various, functionally determined 
policy areas.
At first sight, international authority beyond the EU seems to be primarily 
allocated in an international system consisting of a plurality of states and with 
an unequal distribution of power among them. Yet the variation and diversity 
among a secondary range of international institutions offers initial support to the 
application of a graduated governance concept. Together they form a complex 
set of constraints for nation states and could indicate (depending on their precise 
features and mechanisms) a move towards ‘more governance’ as well as ‘more 
government’. In the words of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye these do not 
replace the nation-state as the primary instrument of domestic and global policy 
formation, but the latter’s centrality as a political entity is ‘being supplemented’ 
by other actors [37]. In a more reductionist fashion, James Rosenau, qualifies the 
concept of MLG as capturing exclusively ‘governmental levels’, albeit with the 
explicit recognition of an additional international level in the interplay of local, 
regional and national institutions [38]. 
 Fur the purpose of this section it is important to qualify their competing 
features also in terms of power relations. Due to differences in the extent of their 
‘contractual relations’ and simultaneous presence in similar or related policy areas 
a degree of hierarchy would be considered necessary to reduce complexity and 
simplify day-to- day policy-making. Frequently, differences follow from their 
functional tasks and under certain circumstances it might be possible to establish 
‘a kind of hierarchy across functions’ since some constraints on nation states are 
more important than others [39].
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 After the collapse of East European forms of co-operation a de-politicization 
and economization of East-West relations set in that turned the EU into the 
‘dominant pan-European actor’ [40]. Its ambition to be recognised as a civilian 
power followed a tendency to rephrase external problems of an enlarging and 
deepening Union in economic-political terms [41]. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the EU had declared in analogy to the common strategy for Russia a common 
strategy for Ukraine already at the end of 1999. Following the EU-Ukraine 
summit in September 2000 political dialogue and practical co-operation in trade 
matters intensified, followed by a resolution of the EP in March 2001 interestingly 
not excluding the prospect of Ukrainian EU membership. In December of the 
same year, the Commission strategy paper for the period from 2002-2006 
promised support for the Ukrainian efforts in institutional, administrative, legal 
and private sector reform as well as in the softening of the social consequences 
of transformation [42]. In these documents, however, no offer of a long-term 
membership perspective appeared and the term itself was, if anything, consistently 
avoided [43].
Before the ‘Orange Revolution’ the state of EU-Ukrainian relations could 
be described as one of mutual disappointment as over a period of ten years since 
the ratification of the Political Co-operation Agreement (PCA) little had been 
achieved [44]. Especially with regard to the reconstruction of economic relations 
the expected deepening did not occur. In part this was due to a misunderstanding of 
the internal workings of the EU as an economic union providing cheap finance and 
a mere forum for the settlement of regulatory issues before trade relations would 
pick up again. In part, however, this too was related to a lack of EU foreign policy 
capacity given the immediate enlargement context and an ongoing crisis situation 
in South-East Europe. Moreover, the EU’s assistance programme (TACIS) lacked 
political visibility and success in Ukraine [46]. Thus, the subsequent embedding 
of EU-Ukraine relations in the NNP was largely seen as a defensive Western 
strategy because of its dominant focus on safe borders, international crime and 
migration rather than on the unresolved questions of economic modernisation. 
Although the basic element of the EU co-operation scheme was said to be the 
‘free movement’ of goods, services, capital and persons, its widely publicized 
interpretation of ‘everything but institutions’ led to a pessimistic assessment of 
any future bilateral agenda. 
On the other hand, the NNP was supposed to offer a closer connection for 
the participating states with the EU than before. In comparison to previous forms 
of co-operation there is the explicit expectation for an extended dialogue and an 
increasing participation in the common market. The stepwise implementation is 
supposed to take place through negotiated action plans specifying how countries 
such as Ukraine can move closer to the EU. The aim in the long run is not 
membership as such, but the harmonization of laws, industrial norms, regulations 
and standards allowing for the full participation in the single market. If realized, 
the action plan would deliver in its substance significantly more than a mere free 
trade agreement after Ukraine has become a member of the WTO [46]. 
Indeed, immediately after the ‘Orange Revolution’, the EU and Ukraine 
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agreed on the 13 December 2004 on an ‘action plan’ identifying 14 main tasks 
with a clear scope for mutual co-operation. The plan effectively extended the 
previous agenda and restated goals and objectives along functionalist expectations 
in a number of policy areas: the strengthening of the stability and effectiveness 
of democratic and judicial institutions, the maintenance of freedom for media 
and public opinion, collaborative efforts in questions of disarmament and security 
policy, WTO accession and the fight against corruption, the introduction of tax 
reforms and the improvement of the investment climate as well as requirements 
concerning the mutual visa-regime [47].
The action plan’s logic was to ‘put the ball back in Ukraine’s court’ as 
there is the potential for its reach to be extended to other policy areas only once 
progress has been made in terms of actual implementation [48]. Clearly, with 
co-operation in some key areas initiating and supporting spill-over effects into 
new areas functional integration could be strengthened. Accordingly, the 9th EU-
Ukraine summit held on 1 December 2005 in Kiev could confirm closer economic 
partnerships in areas such as energy policy, space programmes and transport 
infrastructure. On this occasion, Ukraine also acquired the status of a ‘market 
economy’ confirming, in the words of Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso, that the country’s future is ‘in Europe’ [49]. 
For the time being, however, the EU’s own ability to reduce the gap between 
external expectations and pan-European capacities is fairly limited. In conceptual 
terms, therefore, a notion of ‘multi-layered’ governance (or MLG-x) appears 
more appropriate to come to terms with Ukraine’s location in a third or fourth 
layer of countries with little prospects for immediate membership and delayed 
implementation records for their internal reform projects. In congruence with 
the EU’s own internal development co-operation in its neighbourhood could 
be extended only after the abolishment of trade barriers and barriers to the free 
movement of people has opened up ‘new opportunities for functional integration’ 
[50].
To be sure, the EU treaty states that any European country can apply for 
membership and the well–known ‘Copenhagen criteria’ add further detail on what 
conditions would have to be fulfilled before a positive decision could be reached. 
Yet, it almost goes without saying, achieving progress in the realisation of action 
plans would mean for any potential candidate the subscription to a technocratic, 
bureaucratic and domestic politics-oriented approach of ‘europeanised’ policy-
making [51]. Inevitably, therefore, future membership negotiations after the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria will have to be conceived as an open process, 
with the regular review of the implementation record in light of the acquis 
communautaire and a constant threat to suspend negotiations if internal reforms 
are considered insufficient or not forthcoming [52].
In anticipation of such serious constraints other integration schemes might in 
the long run (re-) gain some attraction. While it is impossible to establish at this 
stage of development a clear hierarchy between competing integration projects, 
there are different assessments as to their potential implications and practical 
feasibility. From the perspective of Ukraine two of them deserve particular 
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attention. First, in September 2003, the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Ukraine signed a formal agreement on the establishment of a Single Economic 
Space (SES) with the intention to move progressively towards 
‘an area consisting of the customs territories of the participants, 
where the mechanisms of economic regulation are intended to ensure the 
free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour; where a common 
foreign trade policy is carried out, and fiscal, monetary, and foreign-
exchange policies are coordinated to the extent needed in securing fair 
competition and macroeconomic stability’ [53].
Obviously in analogy to other ‘multi-level’ and ‘multi-speed’ integration 
schemes these objectives were thought to be achieved gradually with individual 
countries determining the required adjustments, though with the view to create 
eventually a ‘single commission’ governing all policies and a decision-making 
system with each member state controlling voting rights proportional to its economic 
size [54]. Even though Ukraine remained sceptical about this particular scenario 
and rejected the formation of common institutions and a common currency, many 
observers have continued to speculate about the potential of an East-EU and its 
implicit farewell to credible EU (‘West’) ambitions. After a contested ratification 
process of the respective agreement by the Ukrainian Parliament in April 2004 
the debate did not stop and, instead, continued to generate several conflicting 
interpretations. 
Of course, since the break-up of the Soviet Union many proposals for closer 
association have been made regardless of their chances for success. Standard 
assessments qualify them as temporary ‘declaration of intent’ without far-reaching 
implications or lasting relevance given the impact of the ‘Orange Revolution’ and 
the reorientation of political forces in the parliamentary election of 2006 [55]. Yet, 
precisely for the same reasons the SES (or revised versions thereof) could have 
more to offer than a purely symbolic meaning. The debates surrounding it have 
an undeniable potential to become an indicator for the increasing use of economic 
power by Russia and suggest a ‘partial solution’ to the specific bilateral problems 
with Ukraine in the cheap supply of energy resources. Alternatively, it could also 
lend support to the idea of Ukraine moving closer ‘to Europe with Russia’ denying 
any contradiction between the participation in the first stage of the SES as ‘a free 
trade agreement’ and the simultaneous application of EU standards on Ukrainian 
territory [56]. This appears even more plausible after the EU has articulated its 
own priority for the formation of a Common Economic Space (CES) with Russia 
[57].
This second important integration scheme, however, does neither suggest 
nor establish a simple hierarchy as the envisaged elaboration of ‘four common 
spaces’ will be conducted within the previously existing Political Co-operation 
Agreements between the EU and the Russian Federation. In line with MLG–x, 
the political idea of a Common Economic Space (CES) has the aim to establish 
an open and integrated market between the enlarged EU and Russia with the 
help of a gradual removal of obstacles to trade and investment, the initiation of 
voluntary regulatory convergence, the facilitation of trade and the development 
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of an adequate infrastructure network [58]. In addition, the EU side expects a 
selective export of its internal acquis in three related spaces – or areas of co-
operation – referring to matters of external security, justice and home affairs as 
well as cultural affairs including the areas of scientific research and education 
[59]. Unfortunately, and in contrast to the initial expectations articulated by some 
of the new EU member states, the framework agreed upon at a number of EU-
Russia summits in Rome, Moscow and St. Petersburg did not travel well to other 
neighbouring countries in Eurasia, including Ukraine [60]. This, in part, explains 
the new emphasis on the ‘sui generis’ character of the CES even though it shares 
with the SES model a fundamental problem: How, if at all, is it possible to achieve 
the effective implementation of an international agreement on a common standard 
or a harmonised norm in the absence of sustainable, long-term institutional 
capacities to oversee compliance? 
In this situation, the EU’s role in external negotiation processes seems to 
have served as a reminder to the other parties involved that Ukraine continues 
to occupy a rather uncomfortable position between the enlarged Union and the 
Russian Federation. While the EU is right to stress that a hidden project of state-
run capitalism stagnating in authoritarianism cannot be integrated into a truly 
European design, the remaining elements of ‘stagnarchie’ in Ukraine for themselves 
have no real interest in the civilisation of policy formation along any particular 
integration model [61]. As a consequence, and similar to the ‘pre-revolutionary’ 
constellation, the official statements as to the meaning and sustainability of the 
country’s ‘European choice’ have to be handled with care.
In some ways, and bearing in mind the protracted process of forming a 
governing coalition in early 2006, this brings back memories of Leonid Kuchma’s 
pragmatic approach to balance Ukrainian national interests between East and 
West with a ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ simultaneously maintaining and 
developing relations with Europe, Russia and the United States, while avoiding 
the articulation of any irreversible choices [62]. The political elites of Western 
Ukraine, by contrast, expect major political as well economic progress only from 
closer co-operation with the EU and NATO [63]. Yet, a realistic assessment of 
this alleged preference for a Westernised foreign policy doctrine could, at the 
same time, not be understood as an outright rejection of Russian ambitions for the 
larger region [64]. The geo-political location of Ukraine does make it impossible 
to ignore the interests of its large Eastern neighbour. At a conceptual level MLG-x 
reveals a potential for closer ties between the EU, Russia and Ukraine without 
erecting new geographic barriers or entering esoteric debates about the ‘true’ 
meaning of Europe. At any rate, Ukrainian self-interest properly defined seems to 
direct more attention to the question of how to achieve domestic transition rather 
than to the possible choices of extra-territorial allies for this project [65]. In fact, 
breaking with the past could, for example, also mean to decide to stay for the 
foreseeable future out of formal integration schemes, regardless of whether they 
show more Western or Eastern leanings [66]. 
More pragmatically, and giving preference to MLG-x beyond the EU, 
membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) became one of the top 
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foreign policy priorities of the Yushchenko presidency. It continued to be seen as 
a major guarantor for a forward-looking restructuring of the Ukrainian economy 
and as a fundamental prerequisite for any further association agreements with the 
EU. Soon the issue of membership turned into an important test case for the ability 
of the newly formed political forces of the ‘Orange Revolution’ to deal with the 
powerful representatives of industrial lobbies who reject membership because of 
their anticipated exposure to foreign competition specifically in the agricultural 
and steel producing sectors. What is more, a working system of MLG-x initiated 
by WTO membership could be undermined if Russia succeeded earlier in similar 
efforts of joining and, thus, could reintroduce its control not only on oil and gas 
supplies but on bilateral trade relations between the two countries more generally 
[67]. 
In this respect, the ‘pre-Orange Revolution’ agreement on the SES contained 
an important modification to some of the other co-operation schemes entered by 
independent Ukraine: It contained a behavioural commitment by the signatories as 
to their national positions taken in future membership negotiation. The respective 
guidelines specify that 
‘if one member enters the WTO before others, it will promote the 
earliest entry into the WTO of other SES members and, once WTO 
negotiations are under way, to refrain from advancing demands of their 
own.’ [68]
The problems of ‘post-revolutionary’ Ukraine with such a ‘non-aggression 
principle’ are obvious. Yet with the lack of an alternative integration project the 
creation of a negotiated tree trade area via the WTO appeared after all as the 
least demanding option. As Ukrainian trade relations continue to be unevenly 
dispersed between several regional markets it is unlikely that they alone would 
determine a fundamental reorientation towards the EU or Russia [69]. While it 
is true that the EU and the Russian Federation have pursued their own style of 
enlargement policy, they both have so far failed in substantially increasing their 
political-institutional weight and integrationist reach in Ukraine or, as one could 
add, in Belarus and Moldova [70]. 
Therefore, integration may simply be too big a word to capture the intricacies 
of these relationships. As long as the pursuit of any deeper regional arrangement is 
interpreted by a significant part of the domestic political spectrum as an outright 
rejection of their preferred vision deadlock is likely to occur. For this reason a 
multilaterally defined version of MLG-x appears to be the only viable option 
to steer Ukraine out of its current limbo-situation. As a one-sided, traditional 
MLG model would only stir further conflicts it seems sensible to try and free 
political actors from the constant pressure to reach ‘final decisions’ or to make 
‘fundamental choices’. In the polycentric world of the 21st century it appears more 
appropriate to seek multilateral links not only with neighbouring states but with 
a larger range of international institutions and regulatory regimes. In this respect 
the country’s positioning between two centres of gravity should also offer rich 
opportunities for lasting socio-economic change. Such a multilateral framework 
for change, then, would in harmony with MLG-x assumptions place much more 
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emphasis on the desirability of a non-hierarchical dispersion of authority. Taking 
on board the geopolitical realities of Ukraine in this way would, in the eyes of 
many observers, undoubtedly offer more opportunities for the construction of a 
successful state [71]. 
4. Private interests as public actors 
Even more complications in the application of the MLG framework must be 
expected when acknowledging the role of private actors and, in particular, business 
interests in the transformation process of Ukraine. In its basic conception firms 
and governments will accept the need for a structured development of regulations, 
though may disagree about their precise anchoring in national, supranational or 
international institutions. Morevover, for MLG-x to work it would be sensible to 
establish a close linkage with notions of ‘corporate governance’, especially in the 
Ukrainian context, where financial-industrial groups (or ‘clans’) hold substantial 
functional and organisational power easily extending into the regulatory sphere 
of government [72]. 
Thus, the general governance notion according to which private companies 
and non-state actors increasingly do ‘what public actors used to do’ experiences an 
interesting re-interpretation once set in the environment of a post-soviet system. 
No doubt, there too is a ‘blurring of public-private spheres of action’ with ‘public 
governance not independent of private governance’, but the complementary 
extension of these country-specific arrangements into an international system of 
MLG remain severely constrained [73]. For the time being, it is unlikely that 
Ukrainian business groups will operate effectively in multiple arenas, bargaining 
with each other, ‘with a variety of national governments, and with transnational 
actors, including intergovernmental organizations and transnational activists’ 
for the purpose of strengthening the horizontal enforcement of European or 
international regulations [74]. 
Like other countries in East-Central Europe, Ukraine pursued a gradual 
privatisation programme bringing up state property for sale on a case-by-case 
basis. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to speak of a resulting ‘predominance’ 
of the non-state sector in the economy as reportedly two-thirds of major capital 
assets remained in state hands. The public-private distinction holds in so far as 
considerable subsidies and regulatory oversight continued to be provided by the 
state though with comparatively little international involvement, for example, 
in the form of foreign business partners [75]. Consequently, privatisation has 
been particularly slow in ‘classic’ capital-intensive sectors such as energy, 
transport and telecommunications and within sectors belonging to the former 
military-industrial complex [76]. Given the considerable difficulties of devising 
an effective competition policy in both the EU and WTO, institutional changes 
upgrading governance capacity for the enforcement of legislation in these areas 
would be crucial for a working system of MLG-x [77].
The extent to which the current patchy domestic regulatory arrangements 
in the form of committees and commissions can be integrated into supra- or 
international arrangements remains doubtful. Already in the early stages of the 
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privatisation process, long before the events leading to the ‘Orange Revolution’, 
the involvement of regional administrative elites undermined an egalitarian 
redistribution of property rights. Instead, the specificities of privatisation in 
Ukraine led to the formation of an extensive ‘private-public’ network. At various 
levels, this strengthened the influence of businessmen (or ‘clan members’) on 
political decision-making processes as well as the direct say of state administrators 
on their business conduct [78].
Interestingly, it was then Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko, who decided 
in post-revolutionary Ukraine to dissolve ‘Special Economic Zones’ comprising 
about 500 individual business projects benefiting from tax exemptions and low 
regulatory burdens, thus effectively creating a major rift between business interests 
and the newly elected government [79]. To make things worse, she disagreed 
with President Victor Yushchenko who claimed that over the last 14 years 90 per 
cent of privatisations were concluded according to the letter of the law. In his 
view, questioning the legality of those previous transactions and opening a debate 
about potential re-privatizations of up to 3000 companies could only be highly 
detrimental to the country’s overall economic performance [80].
With conflicts developing inside the ‘Orange Revolution’ coalition, the 
problems in (re-) defining business-government relations did not disappear. The 
subsequent formation of the Yekhanurov government indeed saw the limitation of 
the re-privatisation issue to two cases and, more importantly, marked an end to the 
populist ‘bandits to prison’ terminology discrediting the activities of the business 
oligarchs in general terms [81]. The latter now became a new ‘national bourgoisie’ 
fulfilling vital (and ‘good’) functions for society as a whole. Indeed, it is the short 
legacy of the first ‘post-Orange Revolution’ government that has created a major 
obstacle for Julia Tymoshenko to regain the top seat in government, despite 
the relative strong showing of her party in the 2006 parliamentary elections. In 
stark contrast to the European privatisation experience and the EU’s competition 
regime, the highly politicised nature of domestic public-private relations in 
Ukraine continues to indicate a trade-off between gaining credibility in domestic 
(electoral) politics and gaining credibility in dealing with EU institutions in 
Brussels [82].
Similarly, Mlg-x is unlikely to work in the ‘post-Orange Revolution’ 
environment as long as privatization is not accompanied by substantive changes 
in the Ukrainian system of corporate governance [83]. The decision to opt 
for a gradual reform process in the early 1990s had the downside to prevent 
the emergence of institutional mechanisms effectively constraining the rent-
seeking behaviour of individual firms and their management. By including 
multiple bureaucratic interests into negotiations about the scope and substance 
of regulatory control rights, these actors have been able to exploit the old links 
with the ministerial bureaucracy and with sub-national authorities to their own 
personal benefit [84]. As the transfer of specific control powers to supranational 
and international institutions would be vital in an emergent system of MLG, 
strong resistance against any such change from the ‘insiders’ of the system must 
be expected.
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In this situation, incentives leading to a diversification in the composition 
of corporate capital and creating effective control mechanisms over management 
behaviour are missing. The existing legislative norms are likely to be used 
defensively and against any independent welfare-oriented exercise of control 
powers. As a consequence, there is an insufficient flow of foreign capital and 
Western businesses find it difficult to operate according to the ‘typical’ Ukrainian 
rules of the game [85]. Precisely because it is difficult to break with the ‘anti-
investment tradition’ of post-soviet countries and the overriding imperative 
of transnational capital to ‘differentiate carefully between economic sectors, 
countries and regions’, a parallel simultaneous construction of MLG is highly 
desirable, but not easy to achieve [86].
Another element of MLG-x, the building of transnational coalitions and 
horizontal forms of co-operation across boundaries by economic actors, was 
likewise strongly biased before the Orange revolution. To some extent, this 
was also a consequence of the socialist past when co-operation with other 
economic systems had been excluded for ideological reasons. Moreover, in the 
case of Ukraine, nation-building was much closer affiliated with the elaboration 
of a ‘national strategy for domestic recovery’ than with the aim to achieve 
competitiveness on world markets [87]. For the best part of the 1990s it seemed 
that the governing elites had little interest in opening up further to either European 
or Russian investments as both would easily outperform any generic ‘Ukrainian’ 
business alternatives, therefore, leaving no other choice than to opt for a defensive 
strategy [88].
Until the revolutionary changes of 2004 it appeared as if the ‘third way’ 
foreign policy in Ukraine could be best understood as a struggle between 
competing oligarchic formations connected with diverging external economic 
interests revealing either a strong Russian or Euro-atlantic preference. To some 
extent, however, the policy changes introduced immediately after the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ have effectively upset the biased pursuit of business interests and 
resulted in a more balanced pursuit of the related political interests, not exclusively 
in national fora. Surely, Ukrainian business circles share, similar to their Russian 
counterparts, a certain reluctance when it comes to the implementation of an 
EU inspired co-operation scheme championing competitive structures in capital 
intensive industries which at the same time are the focus of their traditional rent-
seeking activities. On the other hand, the ‘penetration of the Ukrainian economy 
by foreign, especially Russian, capital’ is now counteracted by an increased 
availability of credit lines from international financial institutions and an improved 
eligibility for EU regional funding as part of the NNP [89]. 
A working system of MLG-x with regard to government-business relations 
is still in its infancy. On a more positive note, though, transnational economic 
forces have started to play a more pronounced role in ‘post-revolution’ Ukraine. 
Rather than betraying the aim and spirit of the ‘Maidan’, the timid steps towards 
a rapprochement between its two major antagonists in the aftermath of the 2006 
parliamentary election could also be interpreted as a sign of the normalization 
of democratic processes. It is particularly remarkable in this respect that the EU 
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membership ambition articulated by most political parties in the Verkhovna Rada 
has been qualified by an influential part of the Ukrainian business community as 
an inclusive idea that comprises a move ‘to Europe with Russia’ [90]. Of course, 
from the EU’s own perspective, MLG set in the non-institutionalized context of 
the NNP, would quite logically demand such a combined approach. An external 
border with both countries after the latest enlargement round does not have to 
stay in the way of Ukriane’s transnational relations and, in turn, could help to 
effectively use a complementary economic potential once product norms and 
standards have been brought closer into line. 
5. conclusion: crowding out ‘good governance’?
The case of Ukraine as a transformation country with ambitions for EU 
membership highlights some of the problems with extending notions of MLG to 
the wider European context even when significant policy externalities do exist. 
It suggests at this stage a good deal of scepticism to grant this conception of EU 
policy-making far reaching theoretical or explanatory power beyond its own legal 
boundaries. As a framework of analysis it is generally useful, if only to identify and 
highlight the limitations of the export of any particular governance model to the 
wider European neighbourhood. For some time to come the EU will have to rely 
on soft instruments of co-ordination in order to increase its sensibility to culture 
and country context and not to undermine democratisation efforts appropriate for 
a particular stage of political development. 
Table 1 
effects of ‘orange revolution’ on change in Governance 
arrangements 
mlg mlG-x
democratization formal institutions 
+
informal mechanisms
+ / –
alternative frames hierarchical structure 
–
non-hierarchical
+
Business Interests public-private partnerships
+ / –
transnational coalitions
+
+: positive ; –: negative; +/–: neither positive nor negative
In general terms the effectiveness of the EU’s own pursuit of external objectives 
such as democracy and good governance is difficult to judge, also because 
the Commission itself did resist the temptation to devise indicators of success 
[91]. The arguments presented in this chapter therefore qualify the expectations 
about any democratisation strategy in Ukraine. Seen from a comparative angle 
the immediate events of the ‘Orange revolution’ have resulted in a by and large 
positive move in the direction of MLG-x. This extended governance model, 
however, constitutes also a break with the more traditional EU integration project. 
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A finding that is, presumably, not to the liking of all political forces in Ukraine. On 
the one hand, it clearly rejects the notion that EU involvement in its current form 
would crowd out domestic democratisation efforts. On the other, it describes a 
more uncertain future depending on whether multi-level arrangements beyond any 
particular regional integration scheme will be able to provide sufficient structure 
to facilitate system transformation. 
Finally, by concentrating on only three aspects of governance arrangements 
(see Table 1), this chapter avoided to address some of the more fundamental 
problems in Ukrainian society. These are considered to be more firmly rooted 
in failed attempts to accommodate regional diversity and to proceed uncritically 
with the formation of a national identity rather than in the specific design of any 
particular governance arrangement. Yet, if both of these essentially political 
projects were to succeed, MLG-x would be among the first indicators to register 
such fundamental change. 
1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 47th Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, 22-25 March, 2006, San 
Diego, California. The author wishes also to acknowledge the support of the Open 
Society Institute during his posting as a Resident Scholar in the Department of 
International Relations and Diplomatic Service at the Ivan Franko National 
University of Lviv, Ukraine. 2. Anatoliy Halchynsky, “A Response to Verheugen”, 
The Day 7, March 7 (2006) 3. Thus repeating his earlier, equally pessimistic, 
assessments reported in Inna Pidluska, “Ukraine and the EU – What Prospects for 
Integration,” in The EU and Ukraine, ed. Ann Lewis, (London: The Federal Trust, 
2002), 183–4. 4. Walter Mayr and Christian Neef, “Schauen Sie in mein Gesicht,” 
Der Spiegel, no. 52, December 24 (2005): 106–9. 5. Reimund Seidelmann, 
“European Union and Eastern Europe,” in European Union and New Regionalism, 
ed. Mario Telò (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 199–200. 6. Karen E. Smith, European 
Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 133–4. 7. 
This refers also to countries not within the immediate neighbourhood of the 
European Union. See with special reference to Vietnam, David H. Lempert, 
European Community: Policy and Practice on Governance and Democracy 
(London: One World Action, 2004). 8. Smith, Foreign Policy, op. cit., 144, note 4. 
9. Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs, “Europe beyond EU Enlargement,” in 
Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske 
and Budrich, 2003), 19. 10. Mary Farell, “The EU and Inter–regional Cooperation: 
in Search of Global Presence?” in The Political Economy of European Integration, 
ed. Erik Jones and Amy Verdun (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 131–3. 
11. Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, Grenzen und Horizonte der EU (Hamburg: 
Körber–Stiftung, 2005), 62; and Taras Kuzio, “Yushchenko’s First Year: A Mixed 
Balance Sheet,” The Ukrainian Observer 67, no. 6, February (2006): 12. 12. 
Sandra Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 694. 13. Ian Bache, “Multi level 
Governance and European Union Regional Policy,” in Multi level Governance , 
ed. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
352
178. 14. Seidelmann, “Eastern Europe,” op. cit., 197, note 3. 15. See, for example, 
the collection of articles in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, ed., Multi level 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Beate Kohler Koch, ed., 
Linking EU and National Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
G.P.E. Walzenbach, ed., European Governance: Policy Making between 
Politicization and Control (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 16. Jerzy Maćków, Am 
Rande Europas?(Freiburg: Herder, 2004), 278. 17. Ibid., 282–3. 18. Kirk Mildner, 
“Ukraine and the EU: Lessons Learned and Tasks Ahead,” in Prospects and Risks 
Beyond EU Enlargment, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2003), 
133. 19. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi level Governance and European 
Integration (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 41. 20. Ibid., 41. 21. Arthur 
Benz, “Compounded Representation in EU Multi level Governance”, in Linking 
EU and National Governance, ed. Beate Kohler Koch (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 106. 22. B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, “Multi level Governance and 
Democracy: A Faustian Bargain?” in Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and 
Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86–8. 23. Hans van 
Zon, The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine (London: Macmillan, 2000), 
25–6. 24. Taras Wosnjak, “‘Projekt Ukraine’ – Bilanz eines Jahrzehnts,” in Die 
Ukraine, Polen und Europa, ed. Renata Makarska and Basil Kerski (Osnabrück: 
Fibre, 2004), 67–9. 25. Mildner, “Lessons Learned,” op. cit, 134, note 17. 26. 
Eberhard Schneider, Das politische System der Ukraine (Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 152–4. 27. Keith Darden, “Graft and Governance: 
Corruption as an Informal Mechanism of State Control,” (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2003), http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs//Graft%20and%20
Governance.pdf (accessed September 30, 2006). 28. Ibid., 28. 29. In the speech 
given by President Yushchenko to the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–
EU’, October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 30. Benz, “Compounded Representation,” 
op. cit., 104, note 20. 31. With hindsight, of course, this constitutional change can 
also be seen as a causal factor leading to numerous problems and deadlock 
situations in the formation of a new government after the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. See, for example, Olesya Oleshko, “Dismissal of the Government”, The 
Ukrainian Observer 67, no. 6, February (2006): 8. 32. Kuzio, “First Year,” op. cit, 
10, note 10. 33. Nathaniel Copsey, “Popular Politics and the Ukrainian Presidential 
Election of 2004,” Politics 25, no. 2 (2005): 104. 34. At the time of writing four 
such projects had been approved dealing with electricity regulation, anti trust, civil 
aviation and administrative standard setting. See, Natalya Huzenko, “European 
Union Provides Funding,” The Day 7, March 7 (2006): 2. 35. Eberhard Schneider 
and Christoph Saurenbach, “Ukraine – die zweite Transformation,” Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik–Aktuell 59, (2004): 2. 36. Ibid.; in the early phase of the 
re organisation a new Ministry for European Affairs was created separately from 
the Ministry of Economics. The head of this new entity – Olen Rybachuk – held 
also responsibility for the general co ordination of European politics within the 
government administration. 37. See Robert O. Keohane and John S. Nye, 
“Introduction,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and 
John D. Donahue (Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
353
2000), 12. 38. James N. Rosenau, “Strong Demand, Huge Supply: Governance in 
an Emerging Epoch”, in Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and Matthew 
Flinders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31–32. 39. Stephen Welch and 
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “Multi level Governance and International Relations,” in 
Multi level Governance, ed. Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 134. 40. Seidelmann, “Eastern Europe”, op. cit, 189, note 
3. 41. Ibid., 190–1. 42. Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit., 147, note 25. 43. Kempe and 
Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 60–1, note 8. 44. Klaus Schneider, ‘The 
Partnership and Co operation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU – 
Idea and Reality’, in Ukraine on the Road to Europe, ed. Lutz Hoffmann and 
Felicitas Möllers (Heidelberg and New York: Physica, 2001), 66–78. 45. Ukraine 
received 460.8 million ECU from the EU Tacis programme (1991–99). See for a 
critique Kempe and Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 61–2, note 8. 46. 
Gesprächskreis, Horizonte, op. cit., 62, note 10. 47. For further criticism on the 
proposed action plan, see Kataryna Wolczuk, “Ukraine after the Orange 
Revolution,” Policy Brief (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005), 4, http://
www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_ukraine_feb2005.pdf (accessed September 30, 
2006). 48. Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2005), 190. 49. See Andriy Novak, “EU grants 
Ukraine Market Economy Status,” Kyiv Weekly 44, December 7 (2005): 4. 50. 
Kempe and Meurs, “EU Enlargement,” op. cit., 75, note 8. 51. Gesprächskreis, 
Horizonte, op. cit., 48, note 10. 52. Ibid., 81. 53. Lúcio Vinhas de Souza et al., 
“Now So Near, and Yet Still So Far: Economic Relations between Ukraine and the 
European Union,” Kiel Discussion Paper, no. 419 (2005): 19–20. 54. Ibid., 20. 55. 
See, for example, Rainer Lindner, “Die Ukraine zwischen Russland und der EU 
– Anmerkungen zu einer aktuellen Debatte”, in Die Ukraine, Polen und Europa, 
ed. Renata Makarska and Basil Kerski (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2004), 24-6. 56. See, 
for example, Tim Gould, “The European Economic Area: a Model for the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy?” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5, no. 2 
(2004): 191; and Boris A. Shiriaev, “On Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy,” in 
Post-Communist Countries in Search for Security and Stability, ed. Konstantin 
Khudoley (Saint-Petersburg: Saint-Petersburg State University Press, 2005), 111. 
57. For a Russian perspective, see Yuri S. Kuzmin, “Russia–EU relations after 
Fifth Enlargement,” in Post–Cold War Challenges to International Relations, ed. 
Yury Akimov and Dmitri Katsy (Saint-Petersburg: Saint-Petersburg State 
University Press, 2006) 171–2. 58. Pekka Sutela, “EU, Russia, and Common 
Economic Space”, BOFIT Online, no. 3 (Helsinki: Bank of Finland Institute for 
Economies in Transition, 2005), 29. 59. Ibid., 26. 60. For Timofei Bordachev, for 
example, the idea of an EU-Russia Common Economic Space ‘is still meaningless’ 
and suitable only for a debate ‘on a purely theoretical level’. See his “Europe’s 
Russia Problem: Immediate Concerns and Long–term Prerequisites,” in Prospects 
and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement, ed. Iris Kempe (Opladen: Leske and Budrich), 
101. 61. Wosniak, “Projekt”, op. cit., 85–6, note 23. 62. See, for example, Taras 
Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma (London: Macmillan, 1997), 179–226; and Ilya 
Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
354
Press, 1998), 388–92. 63. Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit, 151, note 25. 64. Rawi 
Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 119–20. 65. Lindner, “Anmerkungen,” op. cit., 17, note 
54. 66. See, for example, Abdelal, Purpose, op. cit., 121, note 63; who states that 
‘of all the post-Soviet states, Ukraine certainly was the only one in the 1990s to 
attempt to have partial membership in both the CIS and the EU.’ 67. Maryan 
Polyoviy, “One Year of the Orange Government,” Kyiv Weekly, no. 42, November 
23 (2005): 11. 68. Souza et al., “Economic Relations,” op. cit., 20, note 52. 69. 
Marko Bojcun, “Trade, Investment and Debt: Ukraine’s Integration into World 
Markets,” in Reforging the Weakest Link, ed. Neil Robinson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), 59. 70. For the case of Belarus see, for example, Alex Danilovich, Russian–
Belarussian Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 71. See with references to 
several such ‘multilateral arrangements’: Lindner “Anmerkungen,” op. cit., 26–7, 
note 54; Anatoliy Orel, “Ten Years On: Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” in 
The EU and Ukraine, ed. Ann Lewis (London: The Federal Trust, 2002), 137; 
Schneider, Ukraine, op. cit., 143–6, note 25; Oles Verbnyk, “Uniting in the Name 
of Democracy”, Kyiv Weekly, no. 44, December 7 (2005): 4; and Wosniak, 
“Projekt”, op. cit., 74, note 23. 72. Zon, Political Economy, op. cit., 178–82, note 
22. 73. Maria Green Cowles, “Non–state Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing 
IR/IPE Approaches to European Integration,” in The Political Economy of 
European Integration, ed. Erik Jones and Amy Verdun (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 30. 74. Virginia Haufler, “Globalization and Industry Self–
Regulation,” in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, 
ed. Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 231. 75. Souza et al., “Economic Relations,” op. cit., 19, note 52. 76. 
Hence the regular demand by institutional investors to complete the privatization 
process and to develop a consistent competition policy. See, for example, Hans 
Holzhacker, “Ukraine – Entscheidung im März,” CEE–Report 4 (Vienna: Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt, 2005), 21. 77. Igor Burakowskij identifies several strategies 
employed by business to circumvent market principles. See his 
“Wirtschaftsreformen: die Kluft zwischen Erwartungen und Ergebnissen,” in Die 
neue Ukraine, ed. Gerhard Simon (Köln: Böhlau, 2002), 214. 78. Ibid., 217. 79. 
Mayr and Neef, “Gesicht,” op. cit., 108, note 3. 80. In the speech given by 
President Yushchenko to the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–EU’, 
October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 81. See Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, 
“Faded Orange”, Financial Times, March 24 (2006): 11; and Kuzio, “First Year,” 
op. cit., 11, note 10. 82. After the 2006 parliamentary election Yulia Tymoshenko, 
former Ukrainian prime minister, encountered considerable difficulties in her 
attempt to re establish credibility with the Ukrainian business community as well 
as the EU Commission. She stated in an interview with the Financial Times: ‘My 
name was absolutely artificially connected with reprivatisation in order to discredit 
me.’ See Tom Warner, “Ukraine Ex Premier in Business Pledge,” Financial Times, 
March 30 (2006): 6; and the interview with Olen Ribachyk, then President Viktor 
Yushenko’s chief of staff, by Stephen Suckar on BBC international, Hard Talk, 
May 2 (2006). 83. See Vladimir Sobolev and Vladimir Lazarenko, “Models of 
355
Corporate Governance and Employee Participation: Pecularities in Ukraine and 
Russia,” (Kharkov: Kharkov National University, 2001), http://www.sses.com/
public/events/euram/complete_tracks/corporate_governance/lazarenko_sobolev.
pdf (accessed September 30, 2006). 84. In both Russia and Ukraine this is said to 
have led to a system of ‘multi-level corruption’ and with business practices 
controlled by the old nomenclatura. See, for example, Anastasia Nesvetailova, 
“From ‘Transition’ to Dependent Development: The New Periphery in Global 
Financial Capitalism”, in Reforging the Weakest Link, ed. Neil Robinson 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 128; and Wosnjak, “Project”, op. cit., 77, note 23. 85. 
Burakowskij, “Wirtschaftsreformen”, op. cit., 217, note 76; President Yushchenko 
also stressed for that very reason the need for a new dialogue between business 
and government to reduce the regulatory burden for both national and international 
investors. See his speech at the 5th International Economic Forum ‘Ukraine–EU’, 
October 5–8, 2005, Lviv, Ukraine. 86. Nesvetailova, “Periphery”, op. cit., 135, 
note 83. 87. Bojcun, “Integration,” op. cit., 52, note 68. 88. Ibid., 59; Abdelal, 
Purpose, op. cit., 117, note121. 89. Bocjun, 2004: “Integration,” op. cit., 59, note 
68; Holzhacker, “Entscheidung,” op. cit., 21, note 75. 90. Most commentators had 
already agreed that even a new (old) Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich would 
still have to give priority to ‘European integration’ in the sense of closer co-
operation on a practical level and the construction of Ukraine as a ‘Russia-EU 
bridge’. See Gesprächskreis, Horizonte, op. cit., 52, note 10. 91. Michael 
Dauderstädt, “Exporting Stability to a Wider Europe: From a Flawed Union to 
Failing States,” Europäische Politik 10 (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004) 
1–19.
С. Юрченко 
яЛТИНСКАя КОНФЕРЕНЦИя 1945 ГОДА: ПРИНЦИПы 
ФОРМИРОВАНИя МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ СИСТЕМы 
В ПЕРЕГОВОРАх СТАЛИНА, РУзВЕЛьТА И ЧЕРЧИЛЛя
Ялта, как место, где вырабатывались основы нового мирового порядка, 
складывавшегося в результате Второй мировой войны, стоит в одном ряду 
с такими городами как Мюнстер, что в Вестфалии, где в середине XVII 
века подводились итоги Тридцатилетней войны и закладывались основы 
Вестфальской системы международных отношений; как австрийская Вена, 
где были подведены итоги изменений в Европе и мире рубежа XVIII-XIX 
веков; как французский Версаль и американский Вашингтон, где подводились 
итоги Первой мировой войны и создавалась новая мировая система – 
Версальско-Вашингтонская. При этом конференция «большой тройки» в 
Ялте в 1945 г. обладала тем своеобразием, что это была не итоговая мирная 
конференция, а конференция войны и победы в войне, что, несомненно, 
наложило отпечаток на принимавшиеся здесь решения и конфигурацию 
Ялтинской или Ялтинско-Потсдамской системы международных отношений, 
